Accountability after resignation: what tabling the Justice Varma report means for judging judges

Question (10 marks, ~150 words):

'Judicial independence and judicial accountability are two halves of public trust.' In the light of the tabling of the Justice Varma inquiry report, discuss the constitutional process for removing judges and examine the gaps in India's judicial-accountability framework.

Introduction:

• The Lok Sabha Speaker tabling the committee report on former Allahabad HC judge Justice Yashwant Varma — who resigned mid-probe after burnt cash was found at his home — tests whether a judge's resignation ends a parliamentary inquiry.

The removal process:

• Art 124(4)/(5), extended to HC judges by Art 218; ground of 'proved misbehaviour or incapacity'; motion by 100 LS/50 RS MPs; inquiry under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968; special-majority address by both Houses. No judge has ever been removed.

The precedent it tests:

• In 2011, the Dinakaran and Sen probes were dropped on resignation as 'moot'; scholars argue the law does not mandate this and the Speaker can overturn that precedent.

Why it matters:

• Brings a taxpayer-funded inquiry's findings into the public domain; a completed impeachment can strip pension/perks and enable criminal action.

The gaps:

• An unusable-high removal bar plus a confidential in-house procedure that cannot punish lets a judge resigning under a cloud escape with reputation and pension intact.

Way forward:

• A credible, time-bound statutory accountability mechanism balancing independence with answerability.

Conclusion:

• Independence and accountability are complementary; a one-off tabling needs a standing institutional fix.